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Lessons Learned from Legislative Battle over Anti-Advocacy Language
In every legislative fight, there are challenges nonprofits must face. Whether it is how to frame the debate to how do you pick leadership of a coalition, most legislative advocacy efforts include these challenges. A recent legislative battle in the House provides illustration of a few issues you may encounter.
On October 26, 2005, the House of Representatives passed the Federal Housing Finance Reform Act (H.R. 1461), which includes an Affordable Housing Fund (AHF). With language promoted by the Republican Study Committee, the AHF within the GSE (government sponsored enterprise) bill to create a new regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, was altered to include a provision that would disqualify nonprofits from receiving money from a new affordable housing fund if they have engaged in voter registration and other nonpartisan voter participation activities or lobbying for certain groups within 12 months of applying for the money. They would also be barred from these activities during the grant period, even if non-federal funds were used to pay for it. More specifically, the bill would sweepingly restrict any group that affiliates with an organization that engages in such activities from applying for funds under the affordable housing fund.
Led by the affordable housing community, the nonprofit sector banded together to stop the heinous provision in its tracks. The strategy included direct lobbying, grassroots mobilization, and analyses of the provision.
In a legislative fight, it is essential for information to be spread quickly in the early stages. It is important to build a base of galvanized supporters at the state and local level, which will have the most impact motivating a member of Congress to support an issue. While it is important for organizations to have a clear analysis and reasoning, organizations need to build support in at the state and local level to make a member care about the issue at hand.
Trusting the organizations you are working with is essential any legislative battle. The better-established networks an organization has, the more quickly a leadership structure is established and the organizations can begin to work on disseminating similar information to their networks. More often then not, the groups that come together on an issue do not have the extensive contact that establishes a level of trust.
As essential factor to a successful legislative fight is a strong coalition – a group of organizations working in tandem on a given issue. Working in collaboration with other organizations can heighten the level of expertise on an issue and expand the national, state, and local contacts. Every nonprofit brings a different audience.
This was a problem during the GSE fight. While a resource center was established to serve as a clearinghouse of information, not all documents were always sent around to everyone. As much as possible, a resource center should contain any articles, testimony or letters written. Organizations can use this information to convince legislators that they should support/oppose an issue if there are letters or articles from their district.
Summary "action item" emails are also helpful in keeping all coalition members on task. Having an organization take notes at the meetings and phone calls and then send out emails with meeting notes including what people are going to do. In the GSE fight, we did not do this and it would have helped – people did not remember the tasks they had taken on, or changed their mind about what they wanted to do without consulting people. It also helps keep people on task, reminding them that they have taken an assignment and when it is due.
In some legislative fights, organizations may already have a champion, while in others; they have to start from scratch. It is important to establish and nurture contacts with key members and staff on the issue. Staff can help provide information on a bill's progress, direct you to other key staff members and help deploy a legislative strategy.
The coalition also gave mixed messages to legislative staff. Because the time frame was short, the "asks" changed daily. For example, one day I was calling a member's office to ask if they would sign a bi-partisan Dear Colleague, and the next I was asking them to speak out on the floor against the Manager's Amendment. Having a more clear-cut strategy at the beginning would have helped this.
To do this well, it is essential that representatives from nonprofits understand the legislative process. It is often difficult, since many issues before the coalition involved an understanding of the tax code as it relates to nonprofits and the complexities of the legislative process.
In this case, the pre-established relationship was a both a help and a hindrance. Pre-established relationships can provide immediate access to the legislators an organization is trying to influence. This helps to convey the relevant information in a short period of time – which was essential for any sort of success in the GSE battle. However, this also means that the legislator might wield more influence in the coalition than they should.
Once the coalition was aware that Oxley was going to introduce a manager's amendment, the coalition worked with pertinent legislators and Democratic leadership to establish a strategy. Yet the goals of coalition and the goals of the members were not the same. Unfortunately, the legislators that were serving as our "champions" viewed the addition of an AHF as a "win" – yet the coalition felt that an AHF with such restrictions did not equal a win. The coalition was told that the Democrats were "in line" on this issue, but in separate conversations with staffers, we realized that they were not.
This is where the coalition education efforts can fail if not executed properly. Because of the importance of the AHF to Democratic legislators, they were willing to trade the rights of groups to affiliate for the ability to say they got an AHF. For example, when the Manager's Amendment containing the provision passed, Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) offered a motion to recommit with instructions. A motion to recommit with instructions is a motion to send the bill back to committee, but the instructions provide that it come immediately back to the floor in an altered form. Before the floor debate started, the coalition believed that Frank was going to offer a motion that struck the entire provision. Instead, his motion was only to ensure that the faith-based groups were not precluded from participating – as long as they did not do any of the actions prohibited by the anti-advocacy provisions. The coalition was later told that Frank had done what was "politically possible."
The lesson from this is to keep in mind that legislators will often have different objectives, even if they agree with you. In this case, an AHF with the restrictions was better than no AHF at all to certain legislators. Yet because they kept telling us that they would strike the provision, we never mobilized against the bill.
Additionally, some coalition members felt that they could have had better direction from the champions – while others felt that the legislators had too much influence within the coalition. This is in part because of the differences in coalition members understanding of the legislative process. Having a better understanding of the legislative process would have helped the decision making process within the coalition, because while you must work to obtain, then retain, your champion, a coalition must also do what is right for its sector.
